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*
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Abstract: A qualified pluralism is defended that recognizes value in a variety of forms of political 
theory and resists arguments that purport to show that one particular approach should occupy a 
privileged position. Against realists, it is argued that abstract analyses of political values that bracket 
a wide range of facts about people and their circumstances can be both coherent and important, 
whereas against those who think “ideal theory” or the identification of ultimate principles should come 
first, it is argued that the case for always giving it priority is weak. 
 
 
 
When political theorists reflect upon what they do, they are often drawn to 
making specific methodological prescriptions. John Dunn contends that “[t]he 
purpose of political theory is to diagnose practical predicaments and to show us how 
best to confront them,”1 while at the other end of the spectrum G. A. Cohen declares 
that “the question for political philosophy is not what we should do but what we 
should think, even when what we should think makes no practical difference.”2 Even 
allowing for a distinction to be made between political philosophy and political theory, 
these prescriptions seem to me to be unduly constraining. Political theory is a diverse 
field, accommodating highly abstract inquiries that aim to identify fundamental 
normative principles by putting to one side facts about our natures and the 
circumstances in which we live, as well as more grounded forms of reflection that 
begin by paying close attention to the political problems we face and then seek 
guidance from the normative principles that are immanent in our practices. In 
response to attempts to draw limits to what kinds of political theory should be done, 
or to elevate some forms above others, I shall defend a qualified pluralism that 
recognizes value in a variety of approaches and resists arguments that purport to show 
that one particular approach should occupy a privileged position. Against realists, I 
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argue that abstract analyses of political values that bracket a wide range of facts about 
people and their circumstances can be both coherent and important, whereas I argue 
against those who think “ideal theory” or the identification of ultimate principles 
should come first, that the case for always giving it priority is weak.3  
I focus on the notion of justice in particular.4 I examine three claims that pull 
in different directions, but any one of which, if it were correct, would alone threaten 
to place a serious limit on legitimate theorizing about justice. The first is that a so-
called “ideal theory of justice” is both useless and misconceived because it is founded 
on the assumption that citizens agree on principles of justice, thereby depriving it of 
practical relevance and displaying a misunderstanding of the nature of the political. 
The second claim is that we cannot justify a principle of justice without taking into 
account what the effects would be of adopting it in the particular context that it is to 
govern. And the third one is that we cannot justify conclusions about what justice 
requires in the circumstances we face, with the constraints they impose on us, unless 
we know what justice would require in the absence of these constraints. This third 
claim comes in radical and moderate versions, both of which I shall examine. Neither 
denies the legitimacy or importance of theorizing about justice that takes into account 
local facts about what is feasible. But one version maintains that if we are to justify 
our practical conclusions fully, we have to abstract from all facts about what is 
feasible in order to identify and then defend the ultimate principles of justice that (it is 
claimed) must underlie the arguments for these conclusions; the other version 
maintains that in order to justify these conclusions fully, we need to develop an 
account of justice that involves putting to one side at least some “soft” constraints that 
may change over time, while keeping in place “hard” constraints that derive from 
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physical laws, unchangeable facts about the natural environment, or aspects of human 
nature that are fixed.  
 
I. IDEAL THEORY AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF POLITICS 
Inspired by Rawls’s work, many political philosophers aim to develop an ideal 
theory of justice, or at least, part of one. Ideal theorizing has been criticized on a 
number of grounds, however. In this section I focus on what I think is one of the most 
serious challenges to it, which has emerged from a realist perspective, namely, that 
ideal theory is founded on the assumption that there is convergence on principles of 
justice, and that this assumption not only deprives ideal theory of any practical 
relevance but also betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the political: 
disagreement over conceptions of justice is part of the enduring circumstances of 
politics;5 insofar as ideal theory assumes convergence on a particular conception, it 
denies a constitutive feature of the political.6 
I want to avoid getting drawn into an unprofitable discussion of the nature of 
ideal theory, so I will simply stipulate that the aim of an ideal theory of justice is to 
give an account of a society that is fully just, subject to the constraint that this account 
be capable of playing some role in guiding political action, with the precise nature of 
that role standing in need of further elucidation.7 I will assume that a fully just society 
is one in which the basic institutions realize whatever the correct or best principles of 
justice are that apply to them, and in which its members comply with whatever the 
correct or best principles of justice are that apply to their behavior. I will also assume 
that because ideal theory has the ultimate aim of playing a role in guiding political 
action, it must employ a feasibility condition of some kind. Although there is room for 
reasonable variation in terms of the formulation of that condition,8 an account of a 
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fully just society must at least be compatible with hard constraints — that is, 
constraints on our capacity to realize principles that are part of the human condition 
because they are rooted in physical laws or other unchangeable features of the natural 
environment (such as scarcity of resources), or in aspects of human nature that are 
fixed.9  
The realist challenge that I am interested in does not deny that there may be 
correct or best-defended principles of justice. Instead it argues that disagreement over 
principles of justice will persist even under favorable conditions by appealing to 
empirical claims about the sources of disagreement over these principles, in particular, 
to the way in which disagreement is rooted in what Rawls calls “the burdens of 
judgement”10 and in a variety of nonrational causes. A realist who presents the 
challenge I am envisaging holds that there are no grounds for thinking that citizens 
will come to endorse the same principles solely on the basis of reasoned argument, 
nor that the nonrational causes that influence their judgments about what principles to 
accept will lead them to converge on the same set.11 From the claim that disagreement 
over political principles will persist, and is a source of conflict between citizens, he or 
she concludes that one of the main purposes of political theory is to guide us in the 
face of it, or at least to enable us to reflect upon its normative significance.12 A vision 
of a fully just society where principles of justice are universally shared might provide 
reasons for action for philosopher-rulers who inspire devotion and whose authority is 
unquestioned, but it does not provide reasons for action for real states or ordinary 
citizens living in a democratic society mired in deep and often fractious disagreement.  
 In response to this challenge it might be argued that ideal theorizing is not 
intended to generate practical recommendations by itself. Rather, its main purpose is 
to enable us to develop a nonideal theory that can lead to such recommendations. That 
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may be true, but it doesn't answer the challenge I am considering, at least when it is 
presented in its most powerful form. Defenders of ideal theorizing about justice think 
that it can play a role in guiding political action because the vision of a fully just 
society that it is in the business of working out can serve as a target at which to aim, 
or at least as a standard against which to judge the extent of injustice,13 which, when 
combined with knowledge of what is feasible and the probabilities that different 
courses of action will achieve their aims, together with an assessment of the likely 
costs of each, can provide reasons for political action, such as a reason for favoring 
one particular reform over another. The realist position I am considering maintains 
that a vision of a fully just society in which everyone converges on the same 
principles of justice cannot coherently serve as a target, or even as a standard that 
guides action, because disagreement is part of the enduring circumstances of politics.  
 One reply here might be to challenge the realist’s factual prediction: for 
example, one could try to show that disagreement to a large extent has its roots in 
nonrational causes, the power of which are likely to diminish over time as our 
understanding of the issues improves. I have doubts about the prospects of success of 
a response of this kind. Alternatively, one might defend a milder version of the claim 
that convergence is achievable that is more plausible empirically. For example, in 
Political Liberalism Rawls suggests that under favorable conditions citizens will tend 
to converge on a set of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice.14 Although citizens 
may continue to disagree over which reasonable liberal conception to endorse, it 
might be thought that they will each come to hold one such conception. But that claim 
could also be regarded as empirically implausible, unless the notion of a reasonable 
liberal conception is understood in a way that makes it very inclusive. 15 And even if it 
is understood inclusively, it nevertheless seems likely that even under favorable 
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conditions a significant minority of citizens will endorse unreasonable illiberal (or 
nonliberal) conceptions of justice.  
 Do ideal theorists need to assume convergence on a vision of a fully just 
society and, if so, does this assumption create a problem for them in the way that 
some realists think it does? It might seem that ideal theorists cannot avoid making an 
assumption of this kind given that they aim to identify the principles that would 
govern a fully just society, and a fully just society is one in which there is full 
compliance with principles of justice. Strictly speaking, however, full compliance 
with principles of justice does not require there to be convergence on those principles. 
The citizens of a state may comply with a principle, or a law that embodies it, despite 
disagreement with it: they may regard this principle or law as binding on them, 
perhaps because they regard the procedures that led to its adoption as authoritative; or 
they may recognize self-interested reasons for complying with the law, for example, 
they may be deterred from breaking it by the prospect of being punished.16 Viewed in 
this light, the Rawlsian conception of a well-ordered society in which citizens actually 
endorse the principles that govern it goes beyond full compliance and incorporates an 
element that is unnecessary for an ideal theory of justice.  
 In response it might be said that a society in which citizens not only comply 
with the correct principles of justice but also endorse them would be more just, so an 
ideal theory of justice must assume convergence. In such a society everyone would 
act justly, that is, they would act from the true motive of justice; no one would comply 
with principles of justice merely because of the threat of sanctions. Indeed it might be 
thought that Rawls assumes convergence in a well-ordered society precisely because 
he wants to give an account of a fully just society that could be stable for the right 
reasons. But even if we suppose that a society in which citizens act from the motive 
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of justice would be more just because it would be stable for the right reasons, this 
does not seem to imply that a fully just society requires convergence on the very same 
principles. A society might be fully just even though some comply with just laws and 
policies merely because they recognize the just authority of the decision-making 
procedures that govern them and despite believing that the majority of their fellow 
citizens are mistaken in their view that these laws and policies are just.  
 Insofar as an ideal theory does assume convergence, it would be best to regard 
this as an idealization — that is, as an assumption that may not hold true in any 
actually existing society, or indeed any feasible society, but which is made in the 
process of building a theory in order to simplify its construction.17 For example, 
Rawls assumes that all members of a society are “rational and able to manage their 
own affairs” and that the subject matter of a theory of justice is the basic structure of 
society “conceived as a closed system isolated from other societies.”18 The potential 
problem with these assumptions is not that they describe a state of affairs that is hard 
or impossible to bring about (or that would require a massive violation of individual 
rights in order to do so), but rather that they may have the effect of creating too large 
a gap between the theory and the societies to which it is meant to apply for it to be 
capable of playing a role in guiding political action.19 So does the assumption of 
convergence create too large a gap between the theory and the circumstances to which 
it is meant to apply for it to be capable of doing so?  
 This idea of action guidance is vague: let us say that an ideal theory cannot 
play any role in guiding us if it cannot provide us with any reasons for action 
whatever available empirical knowledge is combined with it. There are several ways 
in which a principle that is part of an ideal theory might provide us with a reason for 
action when combined with empirical knowledge: for example, it may provide a 
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reason here and now for performing an action it prescribes, or it may provide a reason 
for bringing about a state of affairs in which we could perform that action. And there 
are different ways in which a principle might provide a reason for action without that 
reason being conclusive: there may be several principles in play in a given context 
that give us conflicting reasons for action; and these principles may reflect or express 
different values, or they may reflect or express different aspects of an internally 
complex value. But so long as an ideal theory when combined with empirical 
knowledge can provide some reason for action in the circumstances we now confront, 
then that would seem a sufficient response to the charge that it cannot play a role in 
guiding us, even if this reason is outweighed by others.20 So how might an ideal 
theory that assumes convergence on principles of justice play such a role?  
 Even if disagreement and conflict that is rooted in it are a constitutive feature 
of politics, political activity need not always be limited to maintaining order in the 
face of it. There is generally room in modern democracies for the pursuit of other 
ideals and ordinary citizens as well as politicians need to form a view concerning 
what policies they should advocate and support. This is where an ideal theory of 
justice seems to have a potential role to play in guiding action, while at the same time 
deepening our understanding of the issues and making possible a fuller justification of 
our practical decisions. For example, an ideal theorist can work out in more depth the 
visions of a just society that citizens may already have within their sights and assess 
their strengths and weaknesses. The conclusions she reaches, when combined with 
empirical judgments concerning what is politically feasible, what arrangements are 
likely to be stable over time, and what costs would be incurred in instituting those 
arrangements — together with reflection upon the normative implications of 
noncompliance — may then provide her with a reason to support or reject particular 
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policies, a reason to defend those policies in public debate, and a reason to vote for 
particular representatives in elections. Ideal theory, when it is founded on an 
assumption of convergence on principles of justice, is limited in the guidance it can 
provide for dealing with persistent and widespread disagreement over what justice 
requires when that disagreement leads to noncompliance with laws and policies. But 
ideal theorists would regard the inquiry into the proper principles for governing a 
society where that occurs as part of nonideal rather than ideal theory.  
 Realists are likely to argue that my response to the challenge posed by 
intractable disagreement over principles of justice fails to engage at a sufficiently 
deep level with it. Indeed this appears to be what lies behind Matt Sleat’s insistence 
that realism is not simply a version of nonideal theory.21 For him, the idea that there 
needs to be a division of labor between ideal and nonideal theory misses the point that 
we don’t need ideal theory to reflect upon the political problems that confront us, and 
that in assuming away disagreement ideal theory fails to appreciate that such 
disagreement is a constitutive feature of the political. I shall return to the issue of 
whether we need ideal theory to justify our practical conclusions and, if we don’t, 
what its point might be, later in this essay. With regard to the nature of the political, 
ideal theorists can accept that disagreement is the stuff of politics without subverting 
what they do: they can insist that ideal theory can provide practical guidance when 
combined with knowledge about what is feasible, while conceding that it is 
nonpolitical in an important way.22 In order to be plausible, the envisaged division of 
labor between ideal and nonideal theory would involve giving the latter a considerable 
degree of autonomy in relation to the former, and not merely because nonideal theory 
will need to pay attention to empirical research in order to identify what courses of 
action are feasible.23 Deep disagreement is not merely a constraint on the realization 
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of principles of justice, but raises very different kinds of normative questions. When 
nonideal theory takes it into account, the question for it would not simply be: “What 
way of proceeding in the face of the fact that people will inevitably disagree with the 
principles delivered by an ideal theory will enable us to make the most progress 
toward a fully just society, in the light of what is feasible and the costs of 
implementation?” It would also need to focus on questions such as the following, and 
the way in which they arise in particular contexts: How should we respond to those 
fellow citizens who hold (what we believe to be) unreasonable conceptions of justice 
and what procedures should be constructed to deal with such disagreements? What 
reasons, if any, can be given to those who do not regard political procedures as 
authoritative to comply with the outcomes of those procedures when they make 
“demands for legitimation”?24 How should we respond to those who, we believe, 
unreasonably reject those procedures?  
 
II. PRINCIPLES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
Even if some forms of theorizing about justice had no practical relevance, they 
might nevertheless be thought to provide intellectual or philosophical illumination, in 
much the same way that within metaphysics or epistemology a theory of truth or a 
theory of knowledge might do so.25 Ideal theory, when it is defined in the way that I 
have done, must have practical relevance if it is to fulfill its purpose, but we might 
follow Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska in drawing a distinction between ideal 
theory and the theory of ideals, with the latter encompassing abstract normative or 
evaluative theorizing that is not constrained in any way by a need to play some 
practical role.26 Accordingly, my aim in this section is to defend, against a different 
realist challenge, the coherence and value of theorizing about ideals when that simply 
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aims to help us to understand an ideal better. This form of theorizing might enable us 
to identify principles for ranking logically possible states of affairs in terms of how 
just they would be, but it would do so without any regard to the practical implications 
of these principles for the society we inhabit, what institutions would be required to 
realize them, or the feasibility of implementing them.  
 Some realists, such as Edward Hall, would reject this mode of theorizing 
because they maintain that we cannot properly assess normative principles without 
considering what they entail, and in order to assess them “we must consider how 
principles map on, or apply to, the factual contexts which they aim to govern.”27 
Elizabeth Anderson, although not a realist in any conventional sense, goes further in 
one respect, maintaining that ideals need to be put into practice before they can be 
properly assessed. In her view, ideals offer solutions to problems that we experience 
and they need to be tested by “seeing whether they solve the problems for which they 
were devised, settle people’s reasonable complaints, and offer a way of life that 
people find superior to what they had before.”28  
 Hall is surely correct that some principles, particularly those designed for the 
immediate purpose of governing institutions and policy, cannot be properly assessed 
without considering the effects of putting them into practice. His contentious claim is 
that this is true more generally of all normative principles.29 Indeed, Hall’s thesis 
when it is understood as a universal claim about normative principles has an air of 
paradox to it, for how are we to assess the effects of putting a principle into practice 
without appealing to more fundamental normative principles that are not assessed in 
this way? Surely an assessment of the effects of putting a principle into practice will 
at the very least involving determining whether it treats people as equals, whether, for 
example, it is consistent with the more fundamental principle that each person’s life 
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matters equally; yet we cannot insist without circularity that this more fundamental 
principle be assessed in terms of the consequences of putting it into practice. 
 Even if I am right that there are fundamental principles that cannot be assessed 
by considering the effects of implementing them, we might think that these principles 
can always be interpreted differently, and that selecting the best interpretation of them 
will involve considering those effects. If someone proposes that the best interpretation 
of the principle that we should treat people with equal concern and respect is a luck 
egalitarian principle according to which no one should be worse off than another 
through no fault of one’s own, then we cannot assess whether he or she is right except 
by considering the consequences of implementing that principle. Indeed it might be 
thought that even principles such as this one will be indeterminate until they are 
embodied in institutions and policy, lending support to Anderson’s more radical 
contention that we need to test ideals by actually putting them into practice. For this 
reason it might even be regarded as a mistake to think of institutions simply as the 
means through which principles are realized since institutions are always partly 
responsible for giving content to principles. William Galston expresses this idea in the 
following terms: “institutions provide arenas within which abstract concepts of 
principles and aims (rights, the general welfare) are worked up into concrete 
conceptions. As such, they help define the community’s purposes, rather than simply 
putting prior understandings into effect.”30 This line of thought perhaps receives some 
support from Wittgenstein’s considerations concerning rule-following.31 Although his 
remarks on rule-following are complex, and their import is a matter of scholarly 
debate, his observation that any rule can be interpreted differently, and his apparent 
view that what determines the correct interpretation of it are the practices in which it 
is embedded, have clear resonances here.  
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But even if fundamental principles, such as the principle that we should treat 
people with equal concern and respect, admit of different reasonable interpretations, 
there are some interpretations that are ruled out as unreasonable because they cannot 
be reconciled with our intuitions about what abiding by this fundamental principle 
involves. We can often probe these intuitions by considering imaginary cases, and in 
this way give more content to the principle. Indeed, specific interpretations of the 
fundamental principle that we should treat people with equal concern and respect, 
such as the luck egalitarian principle, might also be refined and assessed in this way. 
Elizabeth Anderson is skeptical about thought experiments when assessing ideals and 
principles, on the grounds that evaluative judgement involves expressing feeling, and 
we are not particularly good at predicting our feelings about states we have not yet 
experienced.32 While accepting that our intuitions sometimes differ from what we 
expect when we are confronted by real rather than imaginary cases, it seems to me 
that we should not exaggerate this truth. No doubt it gives us some reason to worry 
about the assessment and refinement of principles solely by considering imaginary 
outcomes, but it does not give us reason to think that this way of proceeding has no 
legitimate role to play.  
Indeed, consideration of imaginary outcomes may be the best way, or even the 
only way, of determining whether it is the case that a principle has some force but is 
outweighed by another principle, or whether instead it is an incorrect principle and 
should be rejected.33 That a principle would have bad consequences if implemented is 
rarely a conclusive reason for rejecting it. Consider the principle “from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his need.” Hall argues that if the 
implementation of this socialist principle of justice would require an ethos that could 
only be sustained by repressive state intervention because it goes against the grain of 
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human nature, then this would give us sufficient reason to reject the principle.34 But 
there are other conclusions that might be drawn here. For example, we might suppose 
that this principle needs to be balanced against another principle of justice that 
requires us to respect basic liberties (or to maximize equal basic liberties) and which 
is outweighed by the latter. If that were the correct diagnosis, the socialist principle 
would still possess independent force. Whether this is the correct diagnosis could be 
“tested” by asking what the principle would imply in relation to a range of cases, 
some of which are unlikely to obtain, where it could be implemented without 
repressive state intervention perhaps because human beings were differently 
motivated, and seeing whether its implications for those cases match our considered 
judgments. It is hard to see why these reflections would be incoherent, even though 
such circumstances might be far removed from “the factual contexts” that the 
principle is to govern.  
The idea that some legitimate forms of normative theorizing, including 
theorizing about justice, might involve identifying principles and then testing them 
against our intuitions about imaginary examples in a way that is independent of any 
consideration of how those principles could be realized through institutions, has the 
implication that when we turned to that question we might find that it is impossible in 
practice ever to realize these principles, and that they could never provide reasons for 
individual or collective action. This might make us start to wonder whether theorists 
engaged in this activity are investigating a rather different concept from those whose 
work is motivated by practical concerns.35 Indeed, could it be argued that those 
engaged in this purely intellectual activity are no longer in the business of theorizing 
justice at all, even if they use that term? It might be claimed that the point of the 
concept of justice is to guide political action, in the sense distinguished earlier, which 
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would seem to imply that a judgment cannot be a judgment of justice unless it can 
guide political action. This might even be taken to support the view that adequate 
principles of justice in particular must meet some sort of feasibility condition, even if 
normative or evaluative theorizing in general is not subject to such a condition.36  
This is a difficult argument to finesse since we need some way of justifying 
the claim that the concept of justice has an inherently practical purpose. It is most 
plausible when it is understood as a claim about our ordinary practice of using the 
term, for example, when we say “these welfare reforms are unjust,” or “the protesters 
were dealt with unjustly” and so on, where the point of making these claims is to 
persuade us of the importance of some action in response.37 But even if we can show 
that the concept of justice has a practical purpose in our ordinary use of it, and that 
theorizing about the requirements of justice is inherently an exercise in practical 
reason, it is hard to know what follows from it.38 If the identity of a concept is fixed 
by its point, it might seem to follow that those who defend normative or evaluative 
principles that can give no practical guidance, whether now or in the foreseeable 
future, must be employing a different concept. But that would be misleading if it was 
then taken to imply that there is no connection at all between “justice” in its practical 
sense and “justice” in its purely theoretical sense. Although it seems unobjectionable 
to suppose that theorists may be engaged in very different activities — some are 
seeking to understand “justice as such” in a way that is independent of any concern 
for what is feasible and the costs of implementation, whereas others are seeking to 
provide principles of justice to govern a possible society — we cannot avoid the issue 
of what the relationship is between these two forms of activity. Regarding these forms 
of activity as focused on different concepts that happen to be denoted by the same 
term would encourage the view that they are entirely unrelated, yet this seems 
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mistaken.39 It will be denied by many of those who see themselves as trying to 
understand justice as such, for they will argue that this form of reflection is logically 
prior, because without it we won’t fully understand the principles that are being 
proposed for governing an actual or possible society, or be able to justify these 
principles fully. If they can establish this claim, it would in effect turn the tables on 
the realist. 
 
III. FEASIBILITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF ACTION-GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Why might it be thought that the full justification of action-guiding principles 
relies on first identifying fundamental principles of justice that provide us with an 
understanding of justice as such, without any concern for what is feasible or what 
costs would be incurred in implementing them? G. A. Cohen has argued that ultimate 
normative principles, including ultimate principles of justice, are not constrained by 
facts about human incapacity. When a fact about human incapacity “is said to exclude 
a principle because it can’t be obeyed, we may then ask what we should say about the 
putatively excluded principle on the counterfactual hypothesis that it could be obeyed. 
And it is only when we thus clear the decks of facts about capacity and get the answer 
to that counterfactual question that . . . we reach the normative ultimate.”40 In other 
words, we reach ultimate normative principles in these cases by abstracting from what 
is feasible, employing a chain of counterfactual reasoning that involves asking 
questions such as, “If it were possible to implement this principle, would justice tell 
us to do so?” or “If it were possible to implement the principle, would an injustice be 
involved in not implementing it?” The relevant ultimate principles do not express or 
entail categorical ought statements; rather they express or entail statements such as “if 
it is possible to do A, then you ought to do A.”41 Presumably Cohen would say much 
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the same about the costs of implementing a principle: if someone objects to a 
principle on the grounds that implementing it would be costly, then in order to 
identify the correct ultimate principle we should ask questions such as, “If 
implementing this principle could be done in a way that was costless, would justice 
favor doing so?” 
What follows from this? It might seem to be a short step to the conclusion that 
the identification of the ultimate principles that are required in order to justify the 
principles — or as Cohen would have it, rules of regulation — that apply in particular 
circumstances would always require us to “clear the decks” of all facts about what is 
feasible and what costs would be incurred in implementing them. 42 That does not 
follow, however. In some cases the ultimate principle that is needed to justify an 
appropriate rule of regulation in a given set of circumstances may have to be 
identified in the light of what is feasible, for there are some ultimate principles that 
apply precisely because of facts about what is feasible. Consider, for example, the 
principle that everyone should be allowed to have the amount and quality of material 
resources that they want. If someone objects to this principle on the grounds that it is 
impossible in practice to satisfy because there are not enough material resources to go 
around, Cohen’s method of interrogation would have us ask, “if it were possible to 
allow everyone to have the amount and quality of material resources that they want, 
would this be what was morally required?” The answer then might well be “yes”: if 
material resources were simply unlimited, now and in the future, then what objection 
could there be to this principle? So the principle that everyone should be allowed to 
have the material resources they want is an ultimate principle that applies on 
condition that resources are bountiful. But if we want to identify the ultimate 
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principles of distributive justice that apply to our world and help us to devise rules of 
regulation for it, then we have to do so on the assumption that resources are scarce.  
More generally, it seems to me that “clearing the decks” of facts about what is 
feasible is not the way to identify a number of the ultimate principles that ground the 
rules of regulation relevant to us and the societies in which we live. Consider another 
example. Suppose that in circumstances where it is possible to meet everyone’s needs, 
justice requires us to do so. But imagine that it is impossible to meet everyone’s needs. 
The principle that we ought to do so does not provide us with any guidance. Even if it 
should not be rejected as an ultimate principle on those grounds alone, we 
nevertheless need some further ultimate principle to guide us in determining and 
justifying the rule of regulation that applies under these circumstances where the 
possibilities are limited, and which explains and justifies how we are meant to balance 
conflicts between, for example, helping the neediest by meeting some of their needs 
as opposed to bringing more people up to the level at which all their needs are met. 
The lesson to be learnt here is that there are some ultimate principles the applicability 
of which depends on facts in the sense that these facts are a condition of the 
application of the principle.  In such cases, we arrive at the ultimate principle by 
keeping in view these facts rather than clearing them away. This may help to deflect 
some of the criticism of Cohen’s work that has come from realists: even if ultimate 
principles of justice are not constrained by facts about what is feasible, some of these 
facts may be relevant because they are conditions for the application of ultimate 
principles.43 
Even when the full justification of the rules of regulation that apply in a given 
set of circumstances does require us to abstract from what is feasible and identify the 
principles that would apply if those circumstances did not limit our options, it is often 
 19 
possible to achieve an adequate justification of what rules of regulation apply without 
doing so. First, as Amartya Sen points out, we can make judgments about what is 
better without making judgments about what is the best, 44 and these judgments may 
often be adequately justified without reference to ultimate principles. Furthermore, as 
John Dunn argues, even when we cannot identify the best outcome, we may be able to 
identify the worst possible outcome (for example, nuclear obliteration), and the need 
to avoid it may provide us with an adequate justification for a particular policy.45  
Second, we may be able to show that in the circumstances we confront, a 
particular rule of regulation follows from any of a number of principles, in which case 
there may be no need to probe further. For example, strict egalitarian, prioritarian, and 
sufficientarian distributive principles may entail the same rule of regulation to govern 
the redistribution of resources in some circumstances where options are limited.  
Third, we can reason analogically on a case by case basis to conclusions that, 
even though they are not backed by a deductively valid argument containing an 
ultimate principle as a premise, may nevertheless be adequately justified. Consider, 
for example, the analogy that Judith Jarvis Thomson used in her well-known article 
on the permissibility of abortion in which you are asked to imagine waking to find 
yourself hooked up to a famous violinist who has a fatal kidney ailment, and given 
your blood group you are the only person who can keep him alive.46 If he is 
unplugged from you now, he will die, but in nine months he will have made a full 
recovery. Thompson argues that even if the violinist has a right to life, it is morally 
permissible for you to disconnect him. She concludes by analogy that even if a fetus 
has a right to life, it is morally permissible for a pregnant woman to abort it. The 
crucial thing to note here is that Thompson’s argument is not deductively valid, and 
nor does it have as one of its premises a general moral principle: it simply appeals to 
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the idea that the two cases are relevantly similar. To the extent that its conclusion is 
justified, its justification relies on the considered judgment that we make in relation to 
the case of the violinist, and on the two cases being relevantly similar, rather than on 
an appeal to principles — and of course many of the objections to it have involved 
drawing out relevant differences between the cases. Insisting that the analogy 
provides a justification for the conclusion only if we can identify the principles that 
underlie it would seem to me to be mistaken.47  
The search for “ultimate principles” through abstracting from all 
considerations concerning what is feasible may also take us a very long way from 
where we are now. Sometimes we may want to say that it leads us to principles for 
beings unlike us, or for a society unlike ours, rather than to ultimate principles for us 
or the society in which we live. Galston makes much the same point when he says that 
reflection on political values that is motivated only by intellectual concerns, and is a 
purely truth-seeking activity, may be the political theory equivalent of science 
fiction.48 He is perhaps more skeptical than I am about the value of this kind of 
activity. In my view it is nevertheless an important and worthwhile approach, for it 
may deepen our understanding of the concept of justice by telling us what justice 
would be like if we were very different beings from what we are, or if we had kinds of 
information or technology that will always be unavailable to us. The way in which it 
deepens our understanding of the concept of justice is no different in the relevant 
respects from the way in which some of the bizarre thought experiments that 
philosophers of mind engage in may deepen our understanding of the concept of 
personal identity, for example, imagining that a person wakes up with all of Guy 
Fawkes’s memories, or that we split a person’s brain in two and transplant each half 
into a new body, or that we “download” all of a person’s memories and “upload 
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them” into a new brain. Reflection on these cases may not provide us with any 
additional help when it comes to judging whether the person in front of us is the same 
person we met up with ten days ago, but they do nevertheless have the potential to 
further our understanding of the nature of personal identity.  
In this respect I am also disagreeing with David Miller when he challenges 
what he calls the “Starship Enterprise view of political philosophy.”49 Unlike Galston, 
Miller in the end thinks that this view of political philosophy is incoherent. He thinks 
that in order to be coherent, political theory must operate under at least some 
feasibility constraints and make some assumptions about what human beings are like 
and the circumstances under which they are living. On this issue, I am at least partly 
on Cohen’s side. I think he is right that we can always coherently and meaningfully 
ask: What principle would apply if human nature was differently constituted — if we 
had different capacities or inclinations, for example — or what principle would apply 
if the world was very different — if there were unlimited resources in it, for example 
— and I believe that in doing so we learn something about the concept of justice, even 
if we don’t identify (more) ultimate principles for us, constituted as we are and 
subject to various hard constraints.50 Indeed by considering what would be just in a 
very different society from ours where we were differently constituted, we may learn 
how various aspects of our society or our natures are important conditions for the 
application of those principles that do apply to us. 
 
IV. ON THE ALLEGED PRIORITY OF IDEAL THEORY 
Cohen’s argument is designed to show that the identification of ultimate 
normative principles sometimes at least requires us to abstract from facts about what 
is feasible, including facts about human incapacity that may have the status of hard 
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constraints. But there is a less radical argument available that is intended to show that 
ideal theorizing which abstracts from most or all “soft” constraints — that is, 
constraints that are malleable to some degree — must be prior to nonideal theorizing 
that addresses the issue of what we should do now in the face of those constraints. 
According to this view, we can be justified in thinking that we are making genuine 
progress toward a fully just society only if we are in possession of an ideal theory that 
tells us what justice would require in the absence of most or all soft constraints. It 
constitutes a response to those such as Sen who think that practical conclusions about 
what we should do now can be justified without any clear understanding of full justice 
because we can be justified in thinking that a state of affairs is more just or less unjust 
without knowing what a fully just state of affairs would be. (If it were successful, it 
would also cast doubt on my argument above, that we can adequately justify what 
principles apply in the circumstances that confront us even if we have not successfully 
identified the ultimate principles that underpin them.) 
The key argument here is developed by John Simmons, building on Rawls's 
conception of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory.51 He argues that any 
defensible nonideal theory of justice must have a transitional rather than merely 
comparative character. Its transitional character means that it requires for its 
application some reasonably well worked-out theory of perfect or full justice.52 Even 
if we can say of two states of affairs C and D that D is more just than C, this does not 
suffice to show that we ought to move to D since a move to D might block the path to 
a fully just society or make that transition much more difficult. Under these 
circumstances, it may be the case that we ought to take one step back in order to take 
several steps forward. Simmons concludes that we need an ideal theory that provides 
us with a conception of full or perfect justice that sets an ultimate target in order to be 
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able to determine whether or not there is a problem of path dependence of this kind. 
He argues that for similar reasons we need an integrated conception of a fully just 
society, rather than simply a conception of what it would mean for a society to be 
fully just along one dimension, for example, in terms of gender justice. Without an 
integrated conception of a fully just society, we will not be able to tell whether a 
reform along one dimension that leaves other dimensions unaffected, and which 
makes a society more just when judged in purely comparative terms, nevertheless 
takes us further away from perfect justice understood as an integrated ideal.  
Simmons is surely correct that path dependence matters. Indeed, it matters 
even for those who think ideal theory is unnecessary or deeply flawed for some reason, 
for there may be circumstances in which we can feasibly create a state of affairs that 
would be more just but we should nevertheless not do so because we would then risk 
much greater injustice in the future.53 But there are a number of possible lines of 
response to Simmons’s claim that a proper appreciation of the problems created by 
path dependence establishes the priority of ideal theory. I will focus on three. He 
partially anticipates the first of these, but it nevertheless shows that there is 
considerable scope for nonideal theorizing without the possession of anything 
resembling a worked out ideal theory. It relies on pointing out that our social 
scientific knowledge is highly limited and we do not have the ability reliably to 
predict what impact efforts to make a society more just will have in the longer term.54 
Indeed, our knowledge of the future tends to become more uncertain the more distant 
it is from the present. We are rarely in a position to know that we could get closer to 
full justice by taking a path that involved making society less just in the short- to 
medium term. Evidence one way or the other will be very hard to come by, yet it is 
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bound to affect any justification for choosing a path that makes society less just in the 
short- to medium term on the grounds that it brings us closer to full justice.  
Simmons acknowledges some of these points but concludes from them that 
when our knowledge of the future is insufficient, all we can do is muddle through and 
then “it may seem acceptable to cross our fingers and just accept whatever 
comparative gains in justice we can get or single-mindedly attack some particular, 
salient injustice.”55 But it seems to me that this is the situation we face in the majority 
of cases when we are contemplating the justice of reforms. I would draw the more 
radical conclusion that in the absence of strong evidence — evidence that is likely to 
be unavailable to us —– that a reform that produces a significant comparative gain in 
the short term is highly likely to make things much worse in the long run, then we are 
justified in supporting it or pursuing it, and indeed are often morally required to do so.  
Second, suppose that full justice will not be achieved even though it could be 
achieved because, say, there are powerful people with a vested interest in preventing 
it from being achieved.56 Under these circumstances, why think that it is full justice 
that should serve as the target, rather than some other standard that there is some 
probability we could achieve? Why would it be justified, say, to move further away 
from what is the best we will achieve on the grounds that doing so would nevertheless 
leave open the bare possibility of moving closer to full justice? Or suppose that full 
justice will not be achieved in the foreseeable future. Why should we choose a course 
of action that keeps open the possibility of achieving it in the distant and 
unforeseeable future, even though it takes us further away from the best we can 
achieve in the foreseeable future?  
Perhaps these reflections give us grounds for thinking that ideal theory should 
be conducted in the light of a different feasibility condition, namely, that principles 
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should be compatible with what could be achieved in the best of foreseeable 
circumstances, rather than with what could be achieved when constrained only by 
human nature and physical laws. But this brings me to the third problem, namely, 
how are ideal theorists to justify the particular feasibility condition that they are to 
employ when constructing the account of full justice that is to serve as the moral 
target or the standard against which reforms are to be judged? Indeed different ideal 
theorists place different feasibility conditions on the adequacy of normative principles. 
For example, Rawls supposes that principles of justice are adequate, that is, are 
candidates to be adopted within ideal theory, only if they could be realized in a 
manner that is stable for the right reasons under favorable circumstances, that is, 
under the best of foreseeable conditions.57 This seems to be more restrictive: it would 
seem to rule out a principle that is compatible with hard constraints but where we 
have good reason to think that it could not be realized under the best of foreseeable 
conditions, given the nature of the soft constraints that exist here and now.58 Allen 
Buchanan, in contrast, argues that ideal theory should meet the condition of “moral 
accessibility,” which involves satisfying three conditions: first, it must be feasible to 
implement it, so it must be “compatible with human psychology, human capacities 
generally, the laws of nature, and the natural resources available to human beings”; 
second, there must be a “practical route from where we are now to at least a 
reasonable approximation of the state of affairs that satisfies its principles”; third, the 
state of affairs that it specifies as ideal must be attainable without unacceptable moral 
costs.59  
Simmons defends Rawls’s conception of ideal theory against Buchanan’s on 
the grounds that Buchanan’s is in tension with regarding the principles of ideal theory 
as ultimate standards, for Buchanan’s version entails that those principles will change 
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as facts about moral accessibility change and it does not allow us to condemn 
arrangements that there is no practicable way of reforming.60 But this response cuts no 
ice against those who hold that ideal theory should set a moral target that is accessible 
from where we are now, rather than identify standards to be used in assessing courses 
of action, and judging the injustice involved in states of affairs, even when there may 
be no practicable means of reform from our current position. It is hard to see why we 
should think that there is a uniquely correct account of the feasibility condition that 
the principles of justice defended within ideal theory should meet. There may be 
limits on what can count as a defensible feasibility condition that are imposed by ideal 
theory’s action-guiding role, but these will permit different reasonable interpretations 
of that condition, perhaps as a result of different views concerning how accessible the 
target it sets needs to be, or perhaps as a result of contrasting conceptions of how ideal 
theory should guide action, that is, whether it should set a target at all or merely 
provide a standard compatible with hard constraints that is to be used in assessing 
different courses of action and states of affairs, irrespective of whether that standard is 
unattainable now or even in the foreseeable future. Because ideal theories may 
reasonably interpret the feasibility condition differently, they may incorporate 
different soft constraints and — if they see themselves as setting a target — employ 
different timeframes for its application. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have claimed that different kinds of political theory are valuable and no 
particular type should always come first. But I am not arguing for a Paul Feyerabend-
style methodological anarchism according to which anything goes.61 Different kinds 
of political theory can be done well or badly: an ideal theory can make idealizations 
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that create too large a gap between it and the society to which it is intended to apply, 
with the result that it is incoherent because it cannot fulfill its aim of playing a role in 
guiding political action; reflection upon political problems may be vitiated by the 
neglect of important empirical evidence, and as result lead to flawed practical 
recommendations. Even when a type of political theory is done well, it may be 
misapplied, or unjustifiable conclusions may be drawn from it: we cannot 
straightforwardly draw conclusions about what justice requires us to do in our world 
from a theory about what justice would require us to do in a world that was very 
different from our own or in which we were very different.  
 The value to us of a particular kind of political theory depends in part on what 
question we want to address, and what we are seeking to gain from addressing it. Are 
we merely seeking intellectual or philosophical illumination by trying to understand 
“justice as such” or are we trying to find solutions to practical problems — or both? 
Political theory that serves a practical purpose by providing guidance on what we as 
individuals, or as collectives, ought to do, whether here and now or in the foreseeable 
future, is clearly important. But so too is political theory that is unnecessary for 
reaching adequately justified conclusions concerning what we should do, or that 
would provide guidance only in some remote possible world, or that merely serves an 
intellectual purpose. Political theory of this kind is valuable because it can provide us 
with a fuller or more complete justification for our conclusions about what we should 
do, or a deeper understanding of ideals such as justice. Employing David Miller’s 
somewhat loaded terms, we might say that there is value in doing political philosophy 
from the perspective of the crew of the Starship Enterprise — that is, theory that 
brackets all considerations of feasibility, including those that arise from human nature 
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— instead of, or in addition to, political philosophy for earthlings, constrained by 
what is possible for societies of them, given where they are and what they can achieve.  
 Nor need there be anything wrong with political theorizing that accepts the 
constraints imposed by deeply entrenched political beliefs, choosing in effect to be 
limited by considerations of political feasibility, and asking how we should act in the 
face of the fact that our fellow citizens have emphatically placed some reforms off the 
political agenda.62 Indeed, doing so may be important for addressing questions such as 
“What should we do here and now?” which is a legitimate question for a political 
theorist. For example, political theorists might ask questions about what regulatory 
frameworks should be applied to publicly funded faith schools in Britain, given the 
widespread commitment to these schools among members of different religious 
groups and the distinctive tradition of state funding for religious schools that exists 
there, even if we believe that it would be better or more just if these schools did not 
exist. Indeed I would like to see more political theory of this kind, even though it will 
have a more parochial character and may not travel very well across political 
boundaries.  
 Since different types of political theory address different questions, there is a 
division of labor between them, and they may often complement each other. But that 
does not settle the issue of whether these questions ought to be addressed in a 
particular order of priority. As part of my defense of pluralism, I have resisted the 
idea that the questions raised in ideal theory concerning what principles would govern 
a fully just society should always be addressed first. But what of the view that 
nonideal theory should always come first because our theorizing should start from 
reflection on particular injustices, with the aim of reaching practical conclusions about 
what should be done to overcome them?  
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 Sometimes the view that nonideal theory should come first is based upon a 
conviction about the proper role of political theory in a democratic society — in 
particular, the view that it ought to make a contribution to public debates about what 
laws and policies should be enacted. For the reasons I have given, however, it is not 
clear why we should think that the value of political theory consists solely in a 
contribution of this kind. But it might be thought that the priority of nonideal theory 
can be grounded in the deeper idea that we are able to understand what is just only by 
reference to what is unjust. David Schmidtz seems to endorse this deeper idea when 
he suggests that “[j]ustice is less a property than an absence of properties that make 
for injustice.”63 If justice is simply the absence of injustice, then we have to identify 
injustice before we can know what justice is. But that it is not enough to show that 
nonideal theory must come first, if by “nonideal theory” we mean “theory that aims to 
reach justified conclusions about how we should respond to injustice in the light of 
what is feasible under the circumstances.” For even if justice is simply the absence of 
injustice, it does not follow that it would be misconceived to try to describe a society 
that had no injustices (that is, was fully just) without first addressing the issue of how 
those injustices should be tackled in practice in order to make it more just. In the face 
of particular injustices, we might think it valuable to deepen our understanding of the 
nature and character of these injustices and the relationships between them by 
addressing the issue of what a society might look like in which they had all been 
eradicated and no new ones had been introduced, irrespective of whether it was 
feasible to bring about such a society. And we might think that this approach is 
worthwhile partly because we believe that the kind of understanding we would then 
acquire is valuable in itself and partly because we believe that if we were to acquire it, 
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we would have more confidence in the proposals we make for reform in the light of 
what we judge to be feasible, and be better equipped to defend these proposals.64  
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